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OUR CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
A constitution is in fact a fundamental law, or basis of gov-
ernment, and falls strictly within the definition of law as given
by Mr. Justice Blackstone. It is a rule of action prescribed by
the supreme power in a state, regulating the rights and duties
of the whole community, says Justice Storey.
By the Constitution of a State or a Nation we mean those
of its rules or laws which determine the form of its government,
and the respective rights and duties of the government toward
the citizens and of the citizens towards the government. A Con-
stitution differs from a statute in that a statute must provide
the details of the subject of which it treats, whereas a Constitu-
tion usually states general principles, and builds the substantial
foundation and general framework of the law and government.
Section 10 of the Constitution of Kentucky which forbids
unreasonable searches and seizures had its fatherhood in the
4th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, pro-
posed in 1789 and adopted in 1791, along with nine other im-
portant additions to our national fundamental law. That
amendment is contained in what is commonly known and called
the "Bill of Rights," being an enumeration of those rights which
the people expressly reserve to themselves when they adopted
our organic law.
Our Federal Constitution as originally drafted contained
no provisions against unreasonable search and seizure but before
the expiration of two years from its adoption an amendment
was proposed to the effect that the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against un-
reasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable eaus6, supported by oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the person or thing to be seized.
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In the same year, 1792, Kentucky adopted its first Constitu-
tion, incorporating a provision, section 9 of article 12, reading:
"The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and possessions from unreasonable seizures and searches; and
that no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or
thing, shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be,
nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation."
In due course legislation was adopted by both the Federal
and State governments, putting into effect these constitutional
interdictions.
In colonial days our fathers were intensely interested in
security from unreasonable search and seizure. The English
government, through its colonial officers in America, harassed
our people upon every pretext by inv&ding their homes for the
purpose of making search and to seize anything, whether de-
scribed or not, in the warrant, if it appeared to offend the law
or the ideas of propriety of the searcher making the raid. Private
lockers and vaults, including private and confidential papers,
and the most sacred possessions were invaded sometimes in the
most wanton way, and it was these unwarranted and unreason-
able searches allowed by the mother country which indelibly
fixed upon the minds and hearts of our fathers the absolute
necessity for a bulwark against such invasions if the home of
Americans were to be, indeed, their castle.
In construing the 4th Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution it has been ruled that a violation takes place when a
representative of any branch or subdivision of the government
gains entrance to the home or office of a person suspected of
crime, by stealth, through social acquaintance, or in the guise
of a business call, and subsequently makes a secret search in the
absence of the suspected person, and seizes papers to be used in
evidence against him. The admission in evidence against a de-
fendant of a paper secretly seized from his possession by a rep-
resentative of the United States government, in violation of
Const. Amend. 4, is contiary to Constitutional Amendment 5,
providing that no person shall in any criminal case be com-
pelled to be a witness against himself. The use in evidence of
papers seized in a search unconstitutional under Constitutional
Amendment 4 is, in effect, to compel a defendant to become a
witness against himself contrary to Amendment 5.
UNREASONATL SEARMES AND SEIZURES
It is well settled that the provisions of the Federal Con-
stitution against unreasonable searches and seizures is a limita-
tion on phe powers of the Federal government, and not a limita-
tion on the powers of the State, nevertheless the constitutions
of the several states generally contain the same or similar
limitations on the State government. Indeed, the first ten
amendments to the Federal Constitution, including, of course,
the 4th, refer to powers exercised by the government of the
United States and not those of the individual states. In other
words, the 4th Amendment is not concerned with State action,
and deals only with Federal action. Almost from the beginning
this principle has been consistently recognized by the Supreme
Court of the United States.1 In the leading cases of Twining v.
New Jersey,2 it was decided that the first eight amendments are
restrictive only of national actions, and while the 14th Amend-
ment restrained and limited State action, it did not take up and
protect citizens of the states from actions by the states as to all
matters enumerated in the first eight amendments, and that ex-
emption from compulsory self-incrimination in the state court
is not secured by the 5th Amendment to the Federal Constitu-
tion, nor is it one of the fundamental rights, immunities and
privileges of citizens of the United States, or an element of due
process of law within the meaning of the Federal Constitution
or the 14th Amendment thereto.
Search warrants, as we know them, did not exist at common
law in early times and Lord Coke in his day denied their
legality. The granting of such writs later came about gradually
and quietly as do such practices, being a pernicious encroach-
ment of autocratic government upon the rights of the people.
These encroachments at first were hardly perceptible and there-
fore indulged, but continued until finally they became so burden-
some and oppressive that the people rose up against them and
caused Parliament, in 1766, to pass resolutions condemning gen-
eral warrants for the seizure of persons, their books and papers.
So to avoid the dangers of unlimited search and seizure
that is to say, unreasonable search and seizure, framers of Ken-
tucky's first Constitution as well as all subsequent documents of
similar nature included a prohibition against unreasonable
1Barron v. Bairmore, 7 Pet. 243; 8 L. Ed. 672; Pom v. Ohio, 5 How.
410; 12 L. Ed. 213-223.2211 U. S. 78; 53 L. Ed. 97; 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 14.
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search and seizures in substance the same as that to which we
-have referred. All present authority, therefore, for the issual
of search warrants, and the exercise of authority thereunder re-
sults from written law, either constitutional or statutory.
Glancing back over our cases from the beginning of the
history of our highest court in Kentucky we find that very few
arose involving the question of search and seizure until very
recent years. The first reported case to reach the Kentucky
Court of Appeals was that of Reed v. Rice.3 That litigation arose
over the custody of slaves, and was a suit by Rice to recover
damages for trespass against Reed who executed the search war-
rant, as he contended, unlawfully. There the court held that
one who acts in good faith upon the command of an officer to
aid in the execution of process, may justify, although the process
may not be regular aid valid; but he who acts officiously must
show a valid process. Judge Underwood prepared and delivered,
the opinion for the court. No question of unreasonableness of
search and seizure was presented save as that question was made
by the contention of Rice that the process was insufficient.
The next case cited in our Digest under the head of "Un-
reasonable Searches and Seizures," is styled Commonwealth v.
WetzeI.4 That search warrant was issued for the purpose of dis-
covering gambling tables and other paraphernalia used in games
of chance, under a special statute authorizing justices of the
peace to issue search warrants for the purpose of discovering
and seizing such paraphernalia. The opinion in that case was
prepared by Judge Lewis in 1886. In the case of Hughes v-
Commonwealth,,5 the right of search and seizure was questioned
by one who was arrested on suspicion of having concealed upon
or about his person a deadly weapon, and it was held that an
officer has no right to search a person upon suspicion that he
is carrying concealed a deadly weapon in violation of law, and
the statutes which furnish the legislative construction of what
is reasonable search and seizure does not authorize such search.
The opinion in the Hughes case was delivered by Judge Du-
Relle for the court in 1897. Thus it will be seen that through
more than one hundred (100) years of the history of Ken-
32 J. J. Marshall 45.
' 84 Ky. 537-
319 Ky. L. R. 479, 41 S. W. 294.
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tucky's highest court there were but three cases adjudged in
which questions of search and seizure were involved.
Kentuckians were not, therefore, greatly annoyed or
harassed by these unusual processes called "Search Warrants"
during the formative and the greater part of the progressive
period of the Commonwealth.
A search warrant is defined as a process issued by a court
of competent jurisdiction, requiring the officer to whom it is
addressed to search a house or other place therein specified, for
the property therein alleged to have been stolen, concealed, or
kept in violation of law, and commanding the officer in case he
finds the thing sought to bring it, together with the body of the
person occupying the house and whose name is set forth in the
warrant before the magistrate or judge issuing the warrant, or
some other justice of the peace, or authorized officer. Formerly
searches under warrant were lawful only in daytime, but now
they may be made either day or night, according to the terms
of the warrant. A search ordinarily implies a quest by an offi-
cer of the law; and a seizure contemplates a forcible disposses-
sion of the owner or the possession of the thing sought.
Although search and seizure was originally instituted
largely for the purpose of discovering and recovering stolen
goods, and discovering and seizing seditious and treasonable
papers and uncovering unlawful plots, in recent years in Ken-
tucky as elsewhere, it has become largely a means and instru-
ment for the discovery and apprehension of persons engaged in
violating laws against the manufacture, sale, transportation and
possession of intoxicating liquors, a purpose almost if not en-
tirely foreign to its original purpose. Occasionally a search
warrant is sued out for the purpose of discovering stolen goods
or locating and discovering papers of an evidential nature. But
the process is now used daily alone for the purpose of discover-
ing and apprehending persons violating what is commonly
known as the "prohibition," or bone dry laws.
It will be observed from a reading of the constitutional pro-
hibition that the inhibition against searches and seizures is
limited only to such searches and seizures as are unreasonable.
The legislative branch of the government is, therefore, impliedly
authorized to pass such laws as do not authorize search and
seizure except in reasonable cases. The decisions appear to war-
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rant the* generalization that a search and seizure is "unreason-
able" within the meaning of the constitutional provision, where,
as in the reported case of People v. Marxyhausenl, it is not au-
thorized by statute, or where the statute under which the war-
rant is issued does not confohm to the conditions under which
the Constitution permits such warrants to issue; or, where the
conditions prescribed by the statute have not been met; or,
where the warrant is not executed within a reasonable time; or,
where the search is made in an unreasonable manner, or where
the seizure is of property other than that connected with the
offense charged.
In Santo v. State,7 it is said that the term "unreasonable"
in the constitutions of the states has allusion to what had been
practiced before the Revolution, and especially to general search
warrants in which the person, place, or thing was not described;
and that no such warrant is unreasonable, in the legal sense,
when it is for a thing obnoxious to the laws, and of a person and
place particularly described and is issued on oath manifesting
probable cause.
The courts of Minnesota have held that the police power of
the state concededly extends to the search, seizure, and destruc-
tion of property which is either the subject of crime or the
means of perpetrating it. Now, when intoxicating liquors are
kept for sale in a prohibition district, they are, with all imple-
ments to facilitate their sale, the subject of crime or the means
for committing it. No one questions the validity of laws pro-
viding for the issuing of warrants for the search, seizure, and
destruction of implements of gaming, lottery tickets, and obscene
books, and other similar articles and means of crime. But it
has been questioned by some courts whether intoxicating liquors
are property of such character as to be subject to the application
of this rule. It is said they do not, per se, fall within the rule;
but on principle, and the great weight of judicial authority, it
must be held that when they are kept for sale in violation of the
laws of the state, and are intended to be used as the subject or
means of crime, it is a question solely for the lawmaking power
to determine whether they ought to be subjected to the rule we
have stated.
03 A. L. R. 1505; 171 N. W. 557.
"2 Iowa 165; 63 Am. Dec. 487 (1855).
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The most outstanding and thoroughly considered opinion
of our Kentucky court of last resort upon certain phases of the
law of search and seizure is that delivered in the case of Yowman
v. Commonwealth,8 prepared by Chief Justice Carroll, in" 1920.
No search warrant was in the hands of the officer at the time he
searched the Youman place and found whiskey which was later
used as evidence against accused. There the court held that evi-
dence obtained by the officer in making an unlawful search was
incompetent and should have been excluded upon seasonable
objection or motion; and further that property (whiskey in the
Youman case) taken in the course of an unlawful search, should,
on motion, be restored to the person from whom it was unlaw-
fully taken. The opinion in that case goes into the history, in
a most enlightening way, of the subject of searches and seizures.
Many cases from other courts are collected, correlated and ex-
amined, and the entire subject covered in a masterly way. One
could do no better, in beginning a study of this important sub-
ject as applied by the courts of Kentucky, than by reading this
opinion.
Since the delivery of that opinion cases involving similar
questions have presented themselves in rapid fire succession until
the court has practically covered what appears to be every phase
of the subject of search and seizure as defined in our Constitu-
tion.
A comparison of the provision in the Federal Constitution
with the 10th section of Kentucky's organic law will show that
the provisions of our State Constitution are somewhat broader
and more general than those of the Federal Constitution upon
the subject of search and seizure. For instance, it is provided
in the Federal Constitution that the rights of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses and effects, against unreasonable
search and seizure shall not be violated; while in the State Con-
stitution it is said the people shall be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and possessions from similar invasions. One em-
ploys the word "effects," while the other uses the word "pos-
sessions." The word "effects" as defined by Bouvier, is prop-
erty or wordly substance, denoting property in a more extensive
sense than goods; embraces every kind of property, real and
personal, including things in action; while the word "posses-
8189 Ky. 152.
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sion" not only relates to the property owned but such things,
both real and personal, as are under the dominion and control
of the owner or possessor. In considering and construing the
word "possessions," as employed in our constitutional provision,
we have given it ,a broader and more general meaning than the
word "effects" is generally allowed. In one case we held the
term broad enough to preclude the right of officers to seach a
farm for an illicit still located in the woodland not far re-
moved from the spring of the owner, but several hundred feet
from his residence. However, we held in the case of Brent v.
Commonwealth,O that "possessions," as used in section 10 of
the State Constitution, was intended to mean those intimate
things about one's person, like in kind to those previously de-
nominated in the same provision. But a more definite descrip-
tion of the word cannot be given, as every case where its ap-
plication is invoked must be determined upon the facts and con-
ditions then under consideration. Looking to the origin and
the history of section 10 of the Constitution and considering the
word "possessions" in relationship to the other words with
which it is to be construed, it is held that that "section was not
intended to apply to the searching of woodland located some-
what remotely from the residence.
Consistently the court has held that persons can be searched
without their consent only when and after a lawful arrest has
been made or search warrant has been issued and delivered for
execution to the officials about to make the search.1 0 One's
house, being his castle, is free from search except under and by
a duly prepared and issued search warrant based upon a state-
ment of facts supported by oath or affirmation 1 reasonably cal-
culated to induce in the mind of the magistrate or judge about
to issue the warrant probable cause' 2 for believing that the per-
son against whom the search warrant is to issue, is and has been
guilty of a violation of law' 3 and that a search of the person,
houses, papers or effects of such person will disclose a given
criminal act or offense. Yaowmn v. (ammonwealtk. Of course,
9 194 Ky. 504.
1OLeRosen v. Commonwealth, 200 Ky. 223.
"Colley v. Commonwealth, 195 Ky. 706.
12 Goode v. Commonwealth, 199 Ky. 755.
3Mattingly v. Com., 197 Ky. 583; Cauidil v. Com., 198 Ky. 695.
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one may always waive his right of freedom from search and
seizure.14
In Indiana it has been held that a statute providing that
"if any person shall make an affidavit . . that such affiant
has reason to believe and does believe" that liquors are unlaw-
fully kept in a certain place, a search warrant shall issue, does
not violate a constitutional provision that no search warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirma-
tion.
The Texas court has this to say on the subject of probable
cause:
"It is obviously true that the legislature cannot dispense with the
reciuirement of the Constitution that probable cause be shown, and
that, therefore, it cannot evade this limitation upon its power by an
attempt to make that probable cause which plainly is not such. But
have we such a case? In determining a question likd this, we must
take into consideration the history of the subject, and what has been
regarded as probable cause, and when we find that that which the
legislature has, in this instance, treated as being sufficient, has been
thus long and extensively so regarded here and elsewhere, by both
legislative and judicial authority, it would be difficult to say that there
is such a plain and palpable violation of the Constitution as to justify
the courts in declaring the statute void; -and if this were the only
objection to the act in question, we should hesitate long before reach-
ing such a conclusion."
Every search warrant must indicate with reasonable cer-
tainty the premises or place to be searched, and thing sought,
describing them as nearly as may be."' 15 Under a constitutional
provision that no warrant to search any place, or seize any per-
son, or thing, shall issue "without a special designation of the
place to be searched," the locality must be definite, certain and
fixed and must be capable of being described and specially desig-
nated; hence, a statute authorizing search for and seizure of in-
toxicating liquors unlawfully kept cannot properly be construed
as warranting the search for and seizure of liquors in a valise,
alleged merely to be in the possession of the defendant, but not
alleged to be in any definite and fixed locality or place. It is
not necessary to state with mathematical accuracy the character
or quantity of the article to be seized, inasmuch as the only de-
1'4Banks v. Cor., 190 Ky. 330; Bruner v. Con., 192 Ky. 386; Ash v.
Com., 193 Ky. 452; Helton v. Com, 195 Ky. 678; Lewis v. Co ., 197 Ky.
449.
Taylor v. Com., 198 Ky. 728; Caudill & McLemore v. Com, 198
Ky. 695; Wilkcerson v. Com., 200 Ky. S99.
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scription which it is possible to give in such cases must be a
somewhat general one.
In the ease of Wilkerson v. Commonwealth, we said this
provision of the Constitution does not require absolute accuracy,
but a description that reasonably indentified the articl or place
to be searched is sufficient.
The affidavit upon which a search warrant may issue must
set forth facts and not conclusions of the affiant; his opinion or
belief is sufficient.' 6 The court has held, however, that an affi-
davit which states that the affiant believes another has in pos-
session intoxicating liquors in violation of law and then sets
forth facts upon which his.belief is based, and these facts are
such as are ordinarily calculated to induce in the mind of a rea-
sonable person belief that the ultimate fact exists, the affidavit
will be sufficient to support the search warrant. An illustration
of this may be found in the case of Head v. Commanwealth,1 '
where it was stated in the affidavit that affiant believed that a
public offense had been committed by having in possession in-
toxicating liquors and then proceeded to set out, in substance,
that the witness had only a short time previously thereto been
in the place of the defendant and had seen liquors purchased
there from him. A judge or magistrate is not authorized to issue
a search warrant on facts personally known to him but not re-
duced to form of an affidavit and made a part of the record.'5
Evidence obtained through and by an unwarranted search
and seizure is generally held not admissible either in civil or
criminal proceedings. 19
If the affidavit upon which a search warrant is issued be
insufficient for any reason to furnish probable cause within the
meaning of the Constitution, or the search warrant is insufficient
in form or substance to meet the constitutional requirement, all
evidence obtained by a search or seizure made under such war-
rant, is incompetent and will be excluded upon motion. How-
ever, it was held by the United States Supreme Court in Burdeau
v. McDowell,20 that constitutional guarantees against unreason-
11Adams v. Conmonwealth, 197 Ky. 255; Carter v. Commonwealth,
197 Ky. 400; Hyde v. Commonwealth, 201 Ky. 673.
"199 Ky. 222.
"Morse v. Con., 204 Ky. 672; Clarke v. Com., 204 Ky. 740.
"Holbrookc v. Corn., 197 Ky. 568; Link v. Com, 199 Ky. 779; Craft
v. Cor, 197 Ky. 612.
256 U. S. 465, 65 L. Ed. 1048.
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able searches and seizures and self incrimination will not be
violated if the Federal prosecuting authorities, to whom in-
criminating papers stolen by private persons have been delivered,
retained them with a view to their use in a subsequent investi-
gation by a grand jury where such papers will be part of the
evidence against the accused, and may be used against him upon
trial, should an indictment be returned, the government having
had no part in the wrongful taking.
An interesting phase of these practices arose in the case of
Ash v. Commanweath,21 where it was held a violation of the
10th article of our Constitution to search the handbag of a
traveler without a search warrant, and solely on suspicion. But
it is not an invasion of a moonshiner's constitutional rights for
officers to search premises where his still is located if the still
be not located on premises owned or possessed by him. 2 2  A
defendant may however have all evidence obtained by spying on
his premises by officers prying in at backdoors and windows ex-
cluded from consideration, if it appear that the officers were on
the premises of the defendant at the time of the discoverey.2 3
This rule, however, does not apply to the evidence of a private
person who, at the time of the obtention of the information, was
on the premises of the defendant for other purposes.
The constitutional provisions against unreasonable searches
and seizures is violated where the search warrant is not exe-
cuted within a reasonable time. And what is a reasonable time is
a question of law for the court to determine in each case, ac-
cording to its circumstances. An unexplained delay of three
days in the execution of such a warrant may be unreasonable.2 4
The sufficiency of an affidavit for search warrant has been
considered and declared by the court in the following cases:
Carter v. Commonwealth,25 it was held insufficient; Golly &c. v.
Comm onwealthb,26 insufficient; Price v. CommonweaZth,27 insuf-
193 Ky. 452.
"Bowling v. Commonwealth, 193 Ky. 642; Weber v. Common.-
wealth, 202 Ky. 499.
hilders v. Co r., 198 Ky. 848; Walters v. Can., 199 Ky. 183;
Jordan v. Corn., 199 KY. 331; Cotton v. Corn, 200 Ky. 349.2"I.n v. Cor ., 199 Ky. 781.
-197 Ky. 400.
195 Ky. 706.
"195 Ky. 711.
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ficient; Mattingly v. Commonwealth,28 insufficient; Caudill, &c.
v. Commonwealth,2 9 insufficient; Walters v. Commonwealth,
30
sufficient; Jordan v. Commonwealth,31 insufficient; Goode v.
Commonwealth,32 sufficient; Kenney v. Commonweatlt, 33 suf-
ficient; Wilkerson v. Commonwealth,3 4 sufficient; Lake v. Com-
monwealth,3 5 insufficient; Dunn v. Comnmonwealth,36 sufficient;
Ingram v. Commonwealth,3 7 sufficient; Moore v. Comnmon-
wealth,38 sufficient; Poston & Crouch v. Commonwealth,
3 9 insuf-
ficient; Hyde v. Commonwealtl,4
0 insufficient; Commonwealth
v. Dincler,41 insufficient; Crouch v. Commonwealth,
42 insuf-
ficient; Munson v. Commonwealth,43 sufficient; Maynard v. Com-
monweath,4" insufficient; Commonwealth v. Diebold,
45 sufficient;
Kendall v. Commonwealth,4 6 sufficient; Hardin v. Common-
'wealth,47 sufficient; Caudill v. Commonwealth,
48 sufficient"
Blackburn v. Commonwealth,4 9 sufficient; Dolan v. Common-
wealth,50 sufficient, and the accused was not permitted to show
that the statements of the affidavit were in fact untrue, or to
raise any question as to the accuracy or source of the affiant's
information. Abshire v. Commonwealth,5 1 sufficient; Clarke v.
Commonwealth,52 insufficient; Vick v. Commonwealth,
13 insuf-
ficient; Fowler v. Commonwealth,"4 sufficient; Baker v. Cov?-
-197 Ky. 583.
2198 Ky. 695.
- 199 Ky. 183.
199 Ky. 331.
-199 Ky. 775.
200 Ky. 221.
-200 Ky. 388.
200 Ky. 266.
-200 Ky. 262.
200 Ky. 284.
-200 Ky. 419.
1201 Ky. 187.
"0 201 Ky. 673.
41201 Ky. 129.
201 Ky. 187.
201 Ky. 274.
"201 Ky. 593.
"202 Ky. 315.
4202 Ky. 169.
- 202 Ky. 670.
202 Ky. 730.
" 202 Ky. 751.
-203 Ky. 400.
" 204 Ky. 725.
' 204 Ky. 740.
'204 Ky. 513.
m 204 Ky. 525.
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monwealth,55 insufficient; Workman v. Commonwealth,5 0 insuf-
ficient; Neal v. Comnonwealth,57 sufficient.
The sufficiency of search warrants has been considered in
the following cases: Caudill & MoLemore v. Qommonwealth,58
sufficient; Walters v. Commonwealth,59 sufficient; Jordan v.
Commonwealth,0 ° insufficient; Wilkerson v. Commcuwealth, 1
sufficient; Ingram v. Commonwealth,62 sufficient; Kendall v.
Commonwealth,63 sufficient; Yopp v. Commonwealth, 4 sufficient;
Blackburn v. Cammonwealt. 65 sufficient; Morse v. Common-
wealth,0 0 sufficient; Ingle v. Commonwealt., 7 sufficient; Work-
man v. Commonwealth," insufficient; and Richardson v. Com-
manwealth,69 sufficient.
The prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure was
placed in the Constitution by its framers for the same reason
similar checks and curbs were incorporated therein, preserving
to the people freedom of speech and of the press, due process
of law, trial by jury, religious freedom and certain other civil
and -political rights, one as sacred as the other. These interdic-
tions are and have been sheltering walls behind which the humble,
uninitiated, but innocent citizen, may stand secure while the
storms of bigotry and fanaticism beat thereon and waste away
"reason against resuming sway." What is a Constitution with-
out a Bill of Rights, either written or unwritten ? Although the
original draft of the Federal Constitution contained no declara-
tion of such rights, the framers of that imperishable document
understood and no doubt had in mind that every inalienable
right mentioned in the Magna Charta had become a part of the
common law of England, and by adoption of this country, the
law of this country and formed the basis of our personal liberty
and security whether specifically stated in the compact or not.
53204 Ky. 536.
-204 Ky. 544.
IST203 Ky. 353.
-198 Ky. 695.
91199 Ky. 183.
'199 Ky. 331.
-2 0 0 Ky. 399.
0200 Ky. 284.
63202 Ky. 169.
"202 Ky. 716.
61202 Ky. 751.
w204 Ky. 672.
IT204 Ky. 518.
"204 Ky. 544.
"205 Ky. 434.
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The rights enumerated in the Bill were, long before its draft-
ing, imperishably fixed in the hearts of the people as the founda-
tion of all laws and of all government, being the essence of that
great American principle which holds all government derives its
just powers from the consent of the governed.
F= D. SAmPSON,
Jwtice of the Court-of Appeals of Kentucky.
Frankfort, Kentucky.
